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Voicing an Opinion: Authorship,
Collaboration and the Judgments of
Justice Bertha Wilson
Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson, Christina Vinters∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Bertha Wilson’s Betcherman Lecture, “Will Women Judges
Really Make a Difference?”1 remains one of the most highly cited
articles by a judge. Certainly, the question she posed in the title is at the
heart of any number of empirical projects considering the role that
identity plays in judicial decision-making. It was thus with interest that
we returned to the text of her speech years after each of us first read it.
Given the controversy that had swirled around the text so many years
ago, we found ourselves reflecting on the surprising moderation of the
piece. With the passage of time, the speech now seemed to us a quite
modest meditation on the role of the judge, the nature of “impartiality”,
and the obligation to judge fairly and objectively. The most provocative
dimension of the article might well be the title. And it is the title that we
begin with: “Will women judges make a difference?”
But though we, like her, take up the terms “women judges”, “make”
and “difference”, we wish to spin them in slightly different directions.
For in asking about difference, our interest is not so much in questions of
judicial identity: who a judge is, or the ways in which elements of
identity (whether gender, race, class, religion or political affiliation)
might influence the substance of a judge’s opinions. Rather, using
Canada’s first woman Supreme Court justice as our point of departure,
we consider the nature of judicial work — the business of “making” the
∗
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Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 507.
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law through the production of written judicial opinions. While
“difference” is a big preoccupation for us, our interest in this piece is
less in the question of whether or not men and women judge differently,
than in the fact of difference between judges: “differences of opinion”
between judges that find textual expression in the form of published
dissenting opinions.
In Part II, we take a brief empirical turn, and spend some time
counting cases, seeking to sketch a portrait of Justice Wilsons’ judicial
work, attending to types of opinions (unanimous, majority, dissenting,
partially dissenting, concurring), and methods of participation (signing
and authoring). We contextualize this portrait by considering Justice
Wilson’s work alongside that of colleagues with whom she sat. There
are two strands in this data. The first, very visible in Part I, focuses
attention on particular judges, raising questions about difference, voice
and identity. In Part III, influenced by the insights of institutional
ethnography, we reflect on a second strand in the data, one which
suggests room for more attention to the complex collaborative and
institutional dimensions to the production of law. If the empirical
snapshot can encourage attention to the role of difference in the work of
Canada’s first woman Supreme Court judge, it should also encourage
attention to the place of difference more generally in the making of law.
Attention to the judgments of Justice Bertha Wilson can enable a robust
discussion about the production of opinions, as well as nuance in our
thinking about the implications of collaboration, authorship and voice.

II. COUNTING TEXTS
1. Justice Bertha Wilson
From the time of her appointment in 1982 to her retirement in 1991,
Justice Bertha Wilson participated in 551 cases that generated written
reasons. Each written opinion addresses two matters: result and reason.
The first of these — result — is something that can generally be
expressed in binary form. Someone wins or loses; there is or is not a
contract; damages are or are not proved; a child is left with or removed
from the parent. But it is not enough for a judge to pronounce the “yes or
no” of result. The judge must also give reasons. The reasons tell us how
the judge’s thinking process proceeded from the facts to the outcome.
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The reasons tell us why certain outcomes are desirable, justifiable or
inevitable:2 why evidence must be thrown out in a given case; how
children are or are not legal subjects; and why some injuries can happen
without obligations on the part of others to help.
In situations where an appellate court produces a unanimous
opinion, reason and result move together. That unanimous opinion may
bear the authorial imprint of one of the judge’s names, or it may be
issued under the nom de plume of “The Court”. But where differences
emerge between judges — differences that make unanimity impossible
— the case will result in the production of multiple texts: a majority
opinion (a text supported by more than half the judges hearing the case),
and one or more dissenting or concurring opinions. A terminological
note is in order here, as the identification of a text as dissenting or
concurring depends on the distinction between result and reason. Where
the minority judges disagree with the result reached by the majority, the
opinion is a dissenting one. Where, however, the minority judges agree
with the result but disagree with the majority reasons, the opinion is a
concurring one. In English, the word “concur” means “to agree”, but in
law, the concurrence is a form of disagreement. This is perhaps more
evident for francophone than anglophone readers since in French, the
terms dissent and concurrence are rendered as dissidences sur les
résultats and dissidences sur les motifs. This linguistic marking better
exposes the distinction between reason and result, and puts emphasis on
the dissenting nature of both types of opinion. The central point for the
empirically minded is that, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the
distinction between a dissent and a concurrence can be problematic: it
straddles the categories of majority and dissent. If one is concerned
primarily with the result in a case, a concurrence can be counted with the
majority. But if one’s concern is with the reasons given, then a
concurrence can instead be counted as a dissent.
There is one further wrinkle. Though a concurrence generally
captures agreement on result and disagreement on reasons, there are
situations in which there is no majority position on reasons. In such
situations — plurality judgments — the concurrence is less a form of
2
As the unanimous court recently said in R. v. Walker, [2008] S.C.J. No. 34, 2008 SCC
34, at para. 19 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras.
15, 24 (S.C.C.): “Reasons for judgment are the primary mechanism by which judges account to the
parties and to the public for the decisions they render. […] Interested members of the public can
satisfy themselves that justice has been done, or not, as the case may be.”
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disagreement with the majority than an articulation of one of several
possible stances in a context where a stable centre has not yet formed.
While such an opinion is also labelled a “concurrence”, there are some
good reasons for separately exploring concurrences produced in the
context of plurality judgments, from those articulated against the
background of a majority position.
In Table 1 below, we have captured all 553 opinions3 in which
Justice Bertha Wilson was implicated, separated both by type of opinion
(unanimous, majority, concurring, dissenting,) and by Justice Wilsons’
status as either “author” or “signatory” of each of these opinions.

TABLE 1
Justice Wilson at the Supreme Court of Canada
(March 4, 1982 to January 4, 1991)
Wilson’s Involvement
Wrote for unanimous court

Number

Percentage

41

7.4%

213

38.5%

48

8.7%

302

54.6%

Wrote majority opinion

22

4.0%

Signed majority opinion

79

14.3%

101

18.3%

Wrote concurrence in plurality
judgment

30

5.4%

Signed concurrence in plurality
judgment

7

1.3%

Wrote a concurring opinion

35

6.3%

Signed a concurring opinion

9

1.6%

Signed with unanimous court
Judgment delivered by “The Court”
subtotal

subtotal

3

Though she participated in 551 opinion-generating cases, she is implicated in 553
opinions, because she signed two opinions in two cases: R. v. A., [1990] S.C.J. No. 43, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) (she signed Cory J.’s majority opinion and a concurrence by Sopinka J.); and
N.B.C. v. Retail Clerks’ Union, [1984] S.C.J. No. 15, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) (where she
signed the per curiam reasons of Chouinard J., and a concurrence by Beetz J.). In each of these two
cases she signed a majority and a concurring opinion, affirming results, but showing herself open to
two sets of reasons.
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Justice Wilson at the Supreme Court of Canada
(March 4, 1982 to January 4, 1991)
Wilson’s Involvement
subtotal

Number

Percentage

81

14.6%

Wrote a dissenting opinion

41

7.4%

Signed a dissenting opinion

17

3.1%

Wrote a partial dissent

10

1.8%

Signed a partial dissent

0

0.0%

Took no part in judgment

1

0.2%

69

12.5%

553

100%

subtotal
TOTAL

One of the first things to note is the predominance of agreement.
Justice Wilson heard 551 cases, and was a signatory to 302 unanimous
opinions (41 that she wrote, 213 which were authored by other judges,
and 48 under the name of “The Court”). She was part of a unanimous
Court nearly 55 per cent of the time. If the majority and unanimous
opinions are added together, one can further say that Justice Wilson
shared the views of her colleagues over 70 per cent of the time.
When it comes to difference, the chart shows us that Justice Wilson,
where she diverged from the majority, was slightly more likely to differ
over the reasons, than over the results: she was more likely to be part of
a concurrence than part of a dissent. For those with an empirical bent,
there is an element of choice in how to think about those concurrences in
the context of her work. If one’s interest is primarily in results, one
might bundle the concurrences with the majority opinions, rather than
with the dissenting ones.
One might take the opinions above, and consider separately those
she signed from those she authored. Justice Wilson is the author of 179
opinions. This means that in nearly one-third of the cases in which she
participated, there is an opinion bearing her name as author. Peter
McCormick reminds us that it is worth distinguishing the minority
opinions a judge writes from those the judge signs: the propensities for
these two modes of support do not tend to echo one another.4 Justice
4
Peter McCormick, “With Respect — Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer Court 19902000” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 89, at 98. According to McCormick, joining a separate opinion
happens only three-fifths on average as often as writing one. With Justice Wilson, the numbers are
even lower, and she signs the dissent of another only two-fifths as often as authoring one.
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Wilson’s production seems to follow this pattern. Of the texts she
authored, for example, there are an equal number of unanimous and
dissenting opinions (41 of each). But if one considers the texts she
signed, the 213 unanimous opinions overwhelm the 17 dissents. Below,
Figures 1 and 2 provide a portrait of the different modes of support in
the “signed” judgments (373 opinions), and the “authored” judgments
(179 opinions).

FIGURE 1
Judgments Signed by Justice Wilson (1982-1991)
Dissent 4.5%
Concurrence
2.4%

Partial dissent
0.0%

Plurality
1.9%
Majority
21.2%

Unanimous
70.0%

FIGURE 2
Judgments Written by Justice Wilson (1982-1991)

Partial dissent
5.5%
Unanimous
22.9%
Dissent 22.9%

Majority
12.3%

Concurrence
19.6%
Plurality
16.8%
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Placed side by side, these two figures show starkly different patterns
of judgment in Justice Wilson’s signed and authored opinions. Certainly,
one can see that unanimity is the dominant theme in the signed
judgments. She was a signatory to 373 opinions, and in less than 10 per
cent of those did she express views which diverged from the majority
position. Between the unanimous and majority opinions, one can see that
Justice Wilson was often in agreement with her colleagues. Indeed,
where she agreed, she was likely to sign on wholeheartedly.
The picture is quite different when one considers the 179 opinions
that bear her name as author. Here, on the contrary, is a portrait of
divergence. Together, the unanimous and majority decisions account for
only 35 per cent of her authored opinions. The rest are variations on the
theme of difference. And if a little less than one third of that difference
emerges as “dissent” (divergence over result), a little more than one third
takes the form of “concurrence” (divergence over reasons, whether
expressed against a stable centre, or in the context of a plurality
judgment). One could certainly conclude, at least in the case of Bertha
Wilson, that her opinions make visible the centrality of difference in her
written judgments.
2. The Supreme Court of Canada
Difference is inevitably a comparative concept, so it is interesting to
consider not only the differences between her written and signed
opinions, but differences that might be visible where her practices of
judgment are set alongside the practices of those judges with whom she
sat. What might this wider lens of inquiry make visible? In Table 2
below we provide some (loose) comparative data on the 15 judges who,
at various times, sat on the bench with Bertha Wilson. In columns 2 and
3 are the total number of unanimous and divided cases in which that
judge participated. Because we are highlighting the question of
“difference”, the columns that follow refer only to those non-unanimous
cases: cases where a judicial difference of opinion produced two or more
written texts. Column 4 thus provides us a sense of the frequency of that
judge’s authorial participation in the context of those divided judgments:
how often the judge wrote one of the multiple texts (whether majority,
concurrence, dissent, or partial dissent). The following columns indicate
“position” independent of authorial role. Columns 5 and 6 capture the
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proportion of times that the judge (whether authoring or signing) was
aligned with a dissent or with a concurrence. The last column bundles
together all divergent texts (dissents, concurrences, partial dissents) to
provide an indicator of the general propensity to differ from the majority
in some fashion. The judges are listed on this table in accordance with
the final column: from most to least likely to diverge from the majority.

TABLE 2
1
Justice
Date of
Appointment
L’HeureuxDubé ♀
15/04/1987
Wilson ♀
04/03/1982
McLachlin ♀
30/03/1989
La Forest
16/01/1985
Lamer
28/03/1980
Sopinka
24/05/1988
McIntyre
01/01/1979
Stevenson
17/09/1990
Beetz
01/01/1974
Dickson
26/03/1973
Estey
29/09/1977
Gonthier
01/02/1989
Chouinard
24/09/1979
Cory
01/02/1989
Le Dain
29/05/1984
Average

2

3

Unanimous Divided
Cases
Cases

4
Took Part
in Writing
(%)

5

6

7
Diverged
Took Part in Took Part in
from
Dissent
Concurring
Majority
(%)
(%)
(%)

340

531

42.7

28.1

31.5

63.3

302

250

55.2

23.2

32.4

59.6

472

555

43.8

19.6

23.6

46.1

306

467

38.8

12.0

30.4

45.2

397

502

44.5

13.4

29.1

45.0

207

382

46.1

17.3

25.7

44.8

407

183

37.2

16.4

23.5

43.7

27

70

25.7

14.3

28.8

42.9

490

134

22.4

11.1

29.1

41.6

486

229

39.3

12.2

27.9

40.5

384

107

42.1

17.8

17.8

37.4

404

506

17.2

12.5

21.3

35.2

289

86

16.3

12.8

20.9

34.9

267

397

35.5

9.8

19.4

31.0

97

70

30.0

5.7

24.3

30.0

325

298

35.8

15.0

25.7

42.8
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There are limits to the conclusions one can draw from this table.
Comparisons here can only be loose ones, since the judges on this table
were appointed at different times, and can thus be understood as
occupying different, if overlapping, streams of time; Chief Justice
McLachlin is still a sitting judge, of course, and so the numbers for her
are still a work in progress. Further, the aggregated numbers for each
judge do not distinguish Charter5 from non-Charter cases. One might
well expect an increase in divided cases with the adoption of the Charter,
as judges grappled with contingent and controversial social issues using
new legal instruments. Table 2 places together judges who participated
primarily in cases heard before the Constitution Act, 1982, with judges
who worked exclusively during the post-repatriation era. As the Table
shows, one-half of the judges sat on courts where less than one-half the
total cases produced disagreement, while the other half produced
judgments in the reverse situation. And of course, though all the judges
here overlapped with Justice Wilson, not all of them overlapped with
each other. Nonetheless, the numbers do provide snapshots for each
judge, a snapshot making visible patterns linked to judicial difference.
Returning to Justice Wilson, we see that she is second in the list of
judges “most likely to disagree”. The top position is held by Justice
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, often referred to as “The Great Dissenter”.
Justice Wilson, however, is not far behind, taking second place. And
indeed, if one looks at the column which captures the rate of concurring
opinions, Justice Wilson holds first place. There is, of course, another
aspect of Table 2 that is unavoidably visible: the three judges most likely
to disagree with the majority position in divided cases are also the first
three (and at the time, the only three) women on the Supreme Court.
Their position at the top of the Table makes it nearly impossible not to
re-invoke the question posed in the title of the Betcherman Lecture. And
one could be forgiven for ironically responding with the observation
that, whether or not women judges will make a difference, it appears that
they will certainly differ.6
Focusing again on Justice Wilson, there is a further observation to be
made. Table 2 shows that Justice Wilson “took part in writing” in over
5
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
6
For an extended meditation on this point, see Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson,
“Les femmes juges feront-elles véritablement une différence? Réflexions sur les décisions des
femmes juges à la Cour suprême du Canada” (2005) C.J.W.L. 27.
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55 per cent of the divided cases in which she participated. This is not
only 20 points above the average participation rate of 35 per cent, but is
also nearly 10 points ahead of her closest competitor, Justice John
Sopinka (with a rate of 46 per cent). Justice Wilson is visibly in the lead
in terms of participation in writing. And of course, as we noted earlier,
when Justice Wilson was the author of an opinion, that opinion
frequently expressed a divergent view: she authored 65 concurrences, 51
dissents and 22 majorities. In short, in the context of practices of
authorship in divided cases, she was much less likely to be writing for
the majority, than to be writing in disagreement. The sheer magnitude of
the numbers is worthy of note. Between the three of them, Justices
Wilson, L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin are responsible for a
significant proportion of the divergent opinions produced by the Court as
a whole.
But what are we to make of this corpus of divergent opinions —
descriptions of “law-that-might- have-been”?7 What is the place of these
outsider opinions, of these expressions from the margins? At the outset,
one might reply that dissent should not be understood as marginal.
Certainly, the tradition of dissent is strongly defended by many
proponents for reasons that are well canvassed in the literature. Dissent
is said to safeguard the integrity of the judicial institution;8 sustain a
robust ongoing legal dialogue across multiple constituencies; fill a
“prophetic” function, providing a source of guidance for the resolution
of similar issues in the future, sowing the seeds of innovation which
sometimes “take root in the spirit of the law”.9 Some dissents are so
7
These dissents are articulated in what Amsterdam and Bruner might identify as “noetic
space”. Noetic space is the term they use to describe the distinctive imaginative space maintained in
every culture. It is the space linked to “a distinctively human mental capacity that compels us to
project our imaginations beyond the ordinary, the expectable, the legitimate — and to involve others
in our imaginings”. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law: How Courts Rely
on Storytelling, and How Their Stories Change the Ways We Understand the Law — and Ourselves
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), at 235. For an extended discussion of dissent and
noetic space, see Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “I Beg to Differ: Questions about Law,
Language and Dissent” in Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury, eds., Law, Mystery & the Humanities:
Collected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming) [hereinafter “I Beg to
Differ”].
8
Some interesting observations on the darker (gendered) side of “collegiality”, see the
comments of Bertha Wilson in Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 152-55, and 415 (see notes 11 and 12) [hereinafter
“Judging Bertha Wilson”].
9
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” (2000) 38
Osgoode Hall L.J. 495-517, at para. 47.
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celebrated that they become “canonical”,10 some dissenters are claimed
by some communities as truth-tellers, prophetically breaking new paths
or speaking truth to power.
And yet, this validation of dissent as structurally necessary in our
legal order, coexists alongside an equally dominant tradition which treats
dissent and dissenters as somewhat tangential to the “main event” which
is what a majority opinion produces: binding precedential law. So,
putting aside particular “canonical” dissents (like Justice Wilson’s
concurrence in R. v. Morgentaler,11 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in
R. v. Seaboyer,12 or Justice McLachlin’s (as she then was) dissent in
Norberg v. Wynrib),13 there is a default tendency to identify dissent as
somewhat of an outsider practice, and thus to see the women’s
heightened propensity to dissent as evidence that they were “isolated at
one edge of the Court”, “left outside the dominant decision-making
coalitions”, or as “very much on the fringes looking on rather than at the
centre helping to steer”.14
And yet, there is something in this understanding of the women
judges’ heightened dissent as a marginal or marginalizing practice that
strikes us as incomplete. Certainly, it does not fully accord with our
experiences as readers of those dissenting opinions.15 Nor does it accord
with our experiences as law clerks at the Court, observing the processes
through which written judicial opinions (majority and dissenting alike)
came into existence. The production of dissenting opinions seemed as
important a part of the Court’s work as was the production of majority
opinions. Further, understanding dissent as marginal is simply
inconsistent with the empirical data presented in Table 2 above. The
numbers in Table 2, far from portraying differences of opinion as
marginal, document the prevalence of divided decisions on the Court.
10

Anita S. Krishnakumar, “On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent” (2000) 52 Rutgers
L. Rev. 781.
11
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
12
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).
13
[1992] S.C.J. No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.).
14
Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2000), at 138 and 155.
15
Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “La dissidence judiciaire : réflexions
préliminaires sur les émotions, la raison et les passions du droit/Judicial Dissent: Early Reflections
on Emotion, Reason and Passion in Law” in Marie-Claire Belleau & Francois Lacasse, eds., Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé à la Cour suprême du Canada, 1987-2002 (Québec: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004), at
699.
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Note that fully one-half of the judges on the Court participated in many
more divided than unanimous cases. Justice Wilson, arriving at the Court
at the same time as the repatriated Constitution, was placed at a moment
in the Court’s history where this increase in divided cases was
happening.
And while we are intrigued by the status of the first three women as
the top dissenters, it is also interesting to consider the judges who come
out at the other end of the scale: Justices Le Dain, Cory and Chouinard.
Putting aside the question of whether it matters that the three judges least
likely to dissent were all men, it is worth acknowledging just what that
“non-dissenter” status means. It means that Justice Le Dain, who in the
divided cases was least likely to disagree with the majority, nonetheless
diverged from the majority opinion (albeit more commonly on reasons
than on results) 30 per cent of the time. Thirty per cent seems
sufficiently high a number to throw into question the characterization of
disagreement as marginal. Even in its mapping of differences between
judges, Table 2 makes it abundantly clear that the difference is central to
the work of judging. There is no judge who has not been a participant in
judicial conflict, no judge who has not been the author of a divergent
judicial text. Every judge has had the occasion of diverging from the
majority, of occupying the role of dissenter, whether on reasons, results
or both.
That being said, the empirical snapshot above does seem to show
difference operating at a higher level in the work of Justice Wilson. And
further, those differences were often of a particular kind. While she often
disagreed with the majority result, she was more frequently in
disagreement with their reasons, seeing something that was missing,
something that needed to be added, something that required comment,
another direction to be taken, a different principle to be applied. Legal
scholars have paid relatively little theoretical attention to the
concurrence as a form of judicial dissent, but one can readily see that
concurrences play an extremely important part in the work of Justice
Wilson.
The statistics also make it apparent that attention needs to be paid to
the concept of “authorship”. Table 2 makes visible the heightened rate at
which Justice Wilson participated in writing opinions in divided cases. It
was not simply that she sometimes saw things differently from the
majority; she more frequently expressed those differences in the context
of a written opinion bearing her name. Much of Justice Wilson’s

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)

VOICING AN OPINION

65

energies on the Court were channelled, it seems, into “voicing” an
opinion — that is, articulating her own view of the law in her own voice.
But our choice of words here of course brings us back to the Betcherman
Lecture, with Justice Wilson’s reference to Carol Gilligan’s work, In a
Different Voice.16 While it is clear that Justice Wilson frequently
authored opinions, it is less clear what conclusions can be drawn on the
basis of that authorship. What is the relationship between one’s views
and one’s voice? Is “voice” just a matter of style, or does it express
something about the identity or character of the speaker? In what ways
might judicial opinions (dissenting or otherwise) provide us with
evidence of a different voice? Would we find difference in the words
chosen, or topics dealt with? Is the difference to be found simply in the
fact that those words were expressed by the first woman on the Supreme
Court?
We are reminded here of Foucault’s classic essay “What is an
Author?”, where he poses his theme using a line from Beckett: “‘What
does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does it matter who
is speaking.’”17 But that is exactly the question made visible in the
empirical data. How might we theorize or understand these various
differences in the opinions that judges voice? Do those differences
matter at all? What are the complications we encounter when trying to
think through questions of judicial authorship? In the next section, we
offer some reflections emerging from our experiences with counting
texts, and trying to understand the place of difference in the making of
judicial opinions. More specifically, we pay some attention to the
relational dimensions of judicial writing, with its combination of sounds,
stemming both from collaboration and unique voices.

III. REFLECTIONS ON COUNTING TEXTS
In what follows, we temporarily step back from the content of
specific texts (whether dissenting, majority or unanimous), as well as
from those texts’ putative authors. Instead of attempting to explain the
prevalence of dissenting texts through reference to their authors (i.e.,
16
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
17
Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 101-120, at 101.
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women dissent more because they see the world differently), we invite
the reader to reflect with us on the fact of these texts. Here, our thinking
has been influenced by Dorothy Smith’s institutional ethnographical
approach. This approach presses us to take a different approach to
familiar sociological objects (here, for example, dissenting judicial
texts). Rather than beginning with the objects themselves (for example,
specific dissenting opinions), it tries to get at the forms of social
knowledge that are implicated in the production of those objects, the
social relations which organize the world of experience. The focus is on
the ways activities are organized and “how they are articulated to the
social relations of the larger social and economic process”.18 In the
context of this project, we are thus challenged to reflect on the work
processes which organize and coordinate the production of judicial texts.
What might such an approach suggest about difference, authorship and
the making of judicial opinions?
1. Texts
At the outset, it is worth stating a point that might seem obvious:
legal relations, part of the larger relations of ruling, are essentially textmediated.19 Law, as we practice it in Canada, is close to unthinkable in
the absence of the judicial and legislative texts which assert, direct, lead,
coordinate, regulate and organize. The work of the Supreme Court is the
production of texts. These texts (judicial opinions) are central to the
reproduction of law’s order; the stability and authority of law is in large
measure a product of the replicability of its texts. Conceding the degrees
of freedom possible in interpretation, it is also the case that interpreters
in various locations are required to grapple with “the same” texts. The
textual mediation of law’s forms of organization is, Dorothy Smith
might argue, “fundamental to its characteristic abstracted, extra-local

18
Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1987), at 152 [hereinafter “The Everyday World as Problematic”].
19
Dorothy E. Smith, “Texts and the Ontology of Organizations and Institutions” (2001) 7
Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies 159 [hereinafter “‘Texts and the Ontology of
Organizations’”]. She explores here the centrality of texts to the ontology of organizations, arguing
that texts are essential to the objectification of organizations, and how they exist and persist as such.
She invites us to consider how texts enter into practices to coordinate activities.

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)

VOICING AN OPINION

67

forms and its curious capacity to reproduce its order in the same way in
an indefinite variety of actual local contexts”.20
This is a point that is obvious, and yet of great significance. As
Dorothy Smith reminds us, in our text-mediated societies, texts are far
more than simple “ideas”. They enter into the construction of social and
physical environments by coordinating activity: they are “key devices in
hooking people’s activities in particular local settings and at particular
times into the transcending organization of the ruling relations”.21 Legal
texts are key documents in the construction and maintenance of justice.
The texts are not just statements of law, or assertions about what the
world is, but are “active”, operating often as speech acts.22 These “speech
acts/texts” are brought to bear on the lives and bodies of the litigants
before them, but also have real impacts even on those who do not know
of the text’s existence. We tend, of course, to think of this active power
of the text primarily in the context of opinions voiced by the majority, as
if those are the only decisions which have the force to make their speech
acts real.23 And yet, though dissenting opinions may not operate in quite
the same way as majority opinions, they are texts produced by the
Supreme Court. That is, the active production of divergent judicial texts
is part of the work of the Court.
This point could seem banal because, in Canada, we tend to take the
presence of dissenting texts for granted. But it is worth remembering that
judicial disagreement does not inevitably produce dissenting texts. In
French appellate courts, by way of comparison, published opinions are
anonymous and appear as if unanimous. There are no dissenting
opinions.24 This does not mean that judges in French appellate courts
cannot or do not disagree. They can and do, but disagreements between
judges as they attempt to reach a decision are protected by le secret du
délibéré. That disagreement is not made visible in the judicial opinion,
which is produced under the nom de plume of “The Court.” The resulting
20

Dorothy E. Smith, Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling
(London, New York: Routledge, 1990), at 2 [hereinafter “Texts, Facts, and Femininity”].
21
“Texts and the Ontology of Organizations”, supra, note 19, at 164.
22
See Carlos L. Bernal, “A Speech Act Analysis of Judicial Decisions” (2007) 1(2) European
Journal of Legal Studies, online at: <http://www.ejls.eu/index.php?mode=htmlarticle&filename=./issues/
2007-12/BernalUK.htm>.
23
Robert M. Cover, “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601.
24
On the place of dissent in the French system, see Wanda Mastor, Les opinions séparées
des juges constitutionnels (Paris/Aix-en-Provence: Economica/Presses Universitaires d’AixMarseille, 2005).
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text may well reflect the unanimous opinion of the judges, but it may
also reflect the opinion of only a majority. Differences and
disagreements may exist between the judges, but they do not emerge in
the form of a published dissenting text.
Our own Court produces just such texts, and they are texts marked
by judicial power. These texts give voice to words of dissent, words
uttered by a judge acting in the capacity of judge. Those words remain
enrobed with the authority of judicial office.25 This makes a dissenting
opinion significantly different from other attempts to persuade or
convince. The words of a dissenting opinion are a direct challenge, and
the majority may be required to enter into dialogue. The dissent has the
ability to force the majority to respond, to answer, to explain, to shift or
to accommodate. And even where a majority does not respond directly,
the very fact of the dissent often means that the majority reasons have
been written differently than they would have been in the absence of a
dissent. While, strictly speaking, only the majority opinion has the
ability to make its view real in the world, the voice of dissent (even if
itself not the law) may have played a part in constituting the shape of the
majority against which it is issued. In the process of constructing the
judgment, the first draft of the majority opinion often is transformed to
meet arguments raised in minority reasons, or to muster support from
other judges. Because of contact with minority opinions in the process of
judgment writing, the officially published majority opinion is often very
different from its first draft. This is also true for early drafts of minority
opinions. In the context of a divided Court, majority and minority views
emerge in conjunction with each other. Majority and diverging reasons
are part of the same event. And though they are voiced in the names of
particular judges, there is a very real sense in which they can also be
understood as part of a more deeply collaborative venture.
The term “collaborative” here is not shorthand for “collegial”, nor
does it assume happy inclusive working relations. Collaborations can be
integrative and inclusive, involve exclusion and excision, result in
unanimous agreement, or generate a series of fractured texts. So, for
example, some scholars, considering dissenting texts written in the style
of majority opinions, speculate that those the texts are failed majority
opinions; and that they provide us with a window into conflicts and

25

For an exploration of the texts of dissent, see, “I Beg to Differ”, supra, note 7.
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struggles between the judges of the Court.26 This is one possibility. But it
may be the case that such an opinion was known to be a dissenting one
from the beginning, and that the judge, supported by his or her
colleagues, actively chose to write it in that style, targeting a future
audience, wanting the full argument to be comprehensible on its own
terms. Certainly, the lure of the detective story solved is always there in
our efforts to figure out what went on behind the scenes, how the various
judges feel about each other, and how the texts came to be the texts that
they are. However, in the end, as Smith might remind us, it is the text
(and not the stories behind the text) that continues to act in the world,
and thus it is the text that remains our focus.
There are many ways to use legal texts to think about the relations
between judges that might have shaped the resulting opinions.27 But our
point is a slightly different one: whether texts are produced in hostile or
hospitable conditions, those conditions are nonetheless collaborative. No
dissenting opinion can come into existence without a majority opinion
that cannot adjust itself to accommodate it. The majority judges may
have as much responsibility for the shape of a dissenting opinion as does
the judge in whose name the dissent is published. In this sense, though
our empirical snapshot directed our attention to Justice Wilson’s
heightened propensity to author dissenting and concurring reasons, it is
interesting to consider the ways that these heightened statistics might tell
us as much about the majority judges’ inability to accommodate Justice
Wilson’s views, as they tell us about Justice Wilson herself.
2. Collaboration
The suggestion that we think of practices of dissent through the lens
of collaboration takes us back to Dorothy Smith, and institutional
ethnography. The approach she proposes is one that sees texts as active,
and which takes seriously the work involved in constituting those texts.
26
Indeed, some argue that there is a category of dissents that read as if they were failed
majorities. For a discussion of typologies of dissent, see Bonnie Androkovich-Ferries, Judicial
Disagreement Behaviour on the Supreme Court of Canada (M.A., University of Lethbridge, 2004)
[unpublished].
27
We attempt one approach at reading opinions for traces of judicial emotion in MarieClaire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “Faces of Judicial Anger: Answering the Call” in Myriam
Jézéquel & Nicholas Kasirer, eds., Les sept péchés capitaux et le droit privé (Montréal: Éditions
Thémis, 2007), at 13.
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The questions she asks us are, How does it happen as it does? and, How
do these texts come to be constituted?
The simple account of collaboration imagines nine judges sitting in
the conference room, discussing a case. Each judge has read the
materials, and has deeply considered the evidence, facts and argument.
Each judge, while honouring the demands of impartiality, hears the case
through the lens of his or her own history of individual life experiences
(military service, disability, trial lawyers, member of bar, children,
single, childless, deaths, law school and associations), experiences that
combine to produce particular attitudes and ideologies. All this provides
the context that enables the judge to come to a decision — to “vote” on
the issue. One might imagine, in this situation, the judges voting, tallying
results and assigning various judges to draft the texts that capture the
views of the various voting blocks.
Such an approach largely focuses our attention on the characters of
the nine judges, seeking to see in them evidence of the results they arrive
at.28 It presumes that “voting” is the main dimension of judicial work,
and tends to underemphasize the “constructing” portion of the
collaborative venture. Indeed, in the common story, whether the Court
produces a single unanimous decision, or a linked set of majority and
dissenting opinions, there is a tendency to speak of the resulting judicial
texts as primarily the work of the authors in whose name those opinions
are published. There is relatively little discussion of the collaborative
dimensions producing those texts. Such an approach seriously
underemphasizes the vast amount of input that comes together in the
production of the finalized texts. It tends to underemphasize the ways
that (particularly in the context of judgments authored by “The Court”)
the judges must work together to construct a text that, in its
representation of the opinions of all, cannot be said to be the product of
any single judge.
In looking to “the work”, Smith suggests we take a more generous
approach, one which attempts to understand and weave together as many
participants as possible. In short, she asks us to consider the “concerted
sequences or courses of social action implicating more than one
individual whose participants are not necessarily present or known to
28

For a comprehensive analysis of individual voting patterns, see C.L. Osterberg &
Matthew E. Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver:
U.B.C. Press, 2007).
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one another.”29 Certainly, there are descriptions of the work of judges
that do provide much more expansive accounts of the processes and
players involved, accounts which emphasize the involvement of far more
than nine people in the production of Supreme Court opinions.30
One might account for the pre-screening (leave to appeal) processes
that determine which cases will and will not be heard. Once a case is
through the filter, the Registrar’s office and Supreme Court Rules govern
the materials that can and must be submitted, the documents that will
come before the Court, the number of pages and the organization of
those materials. What these materials might be is variable depending on
the work performed by a variety of players at lower levels in the
adjudication process. In some cases, clients are self-represented; in
others, there are lawyers. Even here, there is a great diversity of
resources standing behind the counsel of record. There are often teams of
lawyers involved, along with articling students and staff, all in the
production of the record that the Court will have before it. Intervenors
also play an important part, placing new arguments in front of the Court.
These interventions can play a big part in the construction of the
eventual opinion, as it is not at all uncommon for large portions of a
factum to appear directly in a court opinion.
Once the material arrives at the Court, there are additional processes
around that material’s diffusion and absorption. There are staff lawyers
at the Court who produce summaries of materials, facts and issues. There
are three law clerks in each chamber, available to do extra reading and
research, and produce pre-hearing bench memos for the judges on
various aspects of the cases. There is the hearing itself, and the
conversations that occur during it with the various advocates before the
Court. New questions and arguments made during the hearing can shape
and influence the case before the Court. Judges also note the limitations
placed on them in terms of the questions posed, the issues presented, the
strategies of the argumentation, the arguments presented by intervenors,
etc. As Lamer J. put it, the Court is “a prisoner” of the case presented to
them.31
29

The Everyday World as Problematic, supra, note 18, at 155.
See, e.g., Ian Greene et al., Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of
Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998). In particular, see chapter 6 on the Supreme Court of Canada.
31
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 82 (S.C.C.).
30
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There is the post-hearing work, often beginning with a post-hearing
conference. Different Chief Justices may schedule those conferences in
ways that place longer or shorter periods of time before the first
discussions. There are conversations between judges to discuss issues,
sometimes documented in memos, sometimes occurring in hallways;
there are draft judgments and memos between judges; memos from and
to clerks; conversations between clerks and their judges; conversations
between clerks across chambers. The question of how much of this
happens in memo and how much happens informally is also variable,
and different sources give different accounts. The central point for us
here is simply to note that these processes involve a number of parties,
the parties and processes are themselves socially related, and those
relations are part of the work processes through which particular judicial
texts are formed.
Also crucial is that the judges hearing one case are also considering
their responses in terms of other cases recently heard, other cases
scheduled for hearings and other cases in the public arena. As the judges
are making decisions in particular cases, other cases and precedents are
in the background, playing a part in how cases are written, even where
those other precedents do not necessarily feature expressly in the texts.
Existing case law is of course playing a part in structuring the resulting
texts. The law itself (as understood in different ways by different judges)
is one of the players influencing the production of the judicial texts.
One of the challenges is in linking these practices of collaboration to
our understanding of judicial “authorship”. At the end of the day, all
judicial opinions are inscribed under the name of an author. Generally
that means under the name of a particular judge, though the author may
also be in the name of “The Court”. But the practices of collaboration
noted above sit in tension with our traditional ways of attributing
authorship. There is a way in which we all know that decisions implicate
all judges who sign on to them. However, we attribute primary
responsibility for that decision to the judge in whose name it is inscribed,
speaking as though the text captures the voice and view of a particular
judge. The judges who sign opinions, on the other hand, are rarely
characterized in the media as having responsibility for the production of
those opinions. There is less glory (and culpability) in practices of
signing than in practices of authoring. Where judges are “mere”
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signatories, they are less likely to be held publically “responsible” for
their participation.32 It is as if only two or three judges are active: they
construct draft opinions and offer them to the judicial market, where the
remaining judges exercise their market power by choosing to invest their
judicial votes/dollars in one product rather than another.
For us, in thinking about the authorship of judicial opinions, we have
found the analogy to cinematic texts to be a useful one. For while it is
common to speak of a film as being by Hitchcock, Jarmusch or
Spielberg, those films are textual objects whose shape is deeply
determined by many players in addition to the director under whose
name the final product is inscribed. Indeed, the film as text requires the
collaborative participation of many players. The editing or lighting or
casting or sound choices are fundamental to the filmic text that is
produced. Star Wars, for example, would not be the same film without
the John Williams score: one has only to hum the first few notes of
Darth Vader’s theme to bring the villain to life. The point is not that the
“real” author of the film is John Williams and not George Lucas. From
our point of view, to even articulate the question thus (to focus on who is
the “real” author) is partly to miss the point: a filmic text is a
collaborative venture, inscribed generally under the name of a director.
There is, we believe, an analogy to opinions of the Supreme Court.
They too are texts that must be produced, and the process of producing
them is a deeply collaborative one. The process is not as simple as
judges “signing on” as if they are buying goods at a grocery store,
selecting the reasons that most fit their mood or style. Judges are more
deeply involved in the construction of the reasons than that, and
authorship is a more complicated concept. There are many inputs to the
final product. In noting the participation of the parties, lawyers, articling
students, staff members, lower courts, academics and law clerks in this
process, our point is not to make a claim about “the real author” behind
the text. It is rather to acknowledge that the processes of producing
Court opinions are collaborative in a non-trivial way.
32

To give just one example, consider the concurring reasons of Claire L’Heureux-Dubé J.
in R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.). She was pilloried by some in
the press for her reasons, but Gonthier and McLachlin JJ., who agreed with her reasons, were not
subject to the same level of vituperation. On the violence of the personalized attacks, see Hester
Lessard, “Backlash and the Feminist Judge: The Work of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé” in
Elizabeth Sheehy, ed., Adding Feminism to Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’HeureuxDubé (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2004), at 133.
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Written opinions are, in our system, generally produced under the
name of a particular judge, but that judge’s name can in some ways be
best understood as a cipher or a stamp: it does link us imaginatively with
the voice of a particular person, but it also stands as name/function
which acknowledges the existence of a particular collectively authored
text. Perhaps an example can serve to make clear the insight about the
complexity of the collaboration in the production of the text, insights
that might lead us to think differently about the depth of collaborative
participation by Justice Wilson in the work of producing unanimous
decisions — and not only those bearing her name as author. Let us
consider one of the judgments in which Justice Wilson participated in an
unnamed fashion: the unanimous decision of “The Court” in Tremblay v.
Daigle.33
3. Tremblay v. Daigle: A Study in Collaboration
In 1989, a pregnant Chantal Daigle left her boyfriend Jean-Guy
Tremblay. She refused his offer of marriage, reporting him for having
physically assaulted her. In return, he obtained an interlocutory
injunction from the Quebec Superior Court, preventing her from having
an abortion. He had argued that, under section 1 of the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms,34 the foetus was a human being that had
a right to life. As Daigle was approaching the 20th week of her
pregnancy, the Supreme Court authorized an expedited hearing, pulling
judges back from summer vacations and engagements abroad to hear
arguments about the rights of the foetus. Halfway through the hearing,
council for Daigle was advised (and thus required to advise the Court)
that, even in the face of the injunction and the hearing before the Court,
his client had disguised herself to cross the border to the U.S., where she
had obtained an abortion. After an hour-long recess, and the completion
of the hearing, Chief Justice Dickson announced that the Court would
unanimously grant the appeal, with reasons to follow. Three months
later, the nine judges, under the name of “The Court”, held unanimously
that such an injunction could not stand. Neither the Quebec Charter nor
the Civil Code35 conveyed legal personhood upon the foetus. There was
33
34
35

[1989] S.C.J. No. 79, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (S.C.C.).
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12.
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-25.
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no legal basis to the argument that the father’s interest in the foetus he
helped to create gave him the right to veto a woman’s decisions in
respect of the foetus she was carrying.
Generally, this is as much background as we would have on a case:
it is a matter of public record. However, this is one case where we have
more background into the conditions of production of the text. The
biographies of Justices Brian Dickson and Bertha Wilson contain stories
which would have once circulated more narrowly.36 Sharpe and Roach in
particular provide some rich background to the case, having had
exclusive access to 200 boxes of Chief Justice Dickson’s personal
papers, including his working files from the Court.37 That is, they had his
annotated copies of the documents, pre-hearing bench memos prepared
by law clerks, judgment memos, memoranda on the draft reasons of
other judges, conference memoranda prepared by Chief Justice Dickson
shortly after the oral argument (containing the tentative views of his
colleagues after their first discussions), and memoranda to and from
other members of the Court commenting on draft reasons. And so, nearly
20 years after the case, biographical and historical work does enable us
to see behind the name of “The Court” in which the decision was
penned, and to see further into the work processes behind the ultimate
text, a text that would require a decision from the judges on both “result”
and “reasons”. We think a few of these are worthy of emphasis here.
First, the Dickson biography shows us that the decision to allow the
appeal was not necessarily as self-evident as the unanimous judicial
opinion suggests. Sharpe and Roach tell us that several members of the
Court felt that Daigle had abused the court process, and should have
been subject to an action for contempt of court.38 Chief Justice Dickson,
we are told, “was furious and he wanted to end the case on the spot”.39
At this point, however, Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she then was)
commented that the Court should put itself in the position of Chantal
Daigle, a desperate young woman who did not want to carry the child of
36
Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2003), at 389-96 [hereinafter “A Judge’s Journey”]; Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note
8, at 295-97.
37
In the preface to Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey, id., Sharpe and Roach provide a
detailed discussion of the materials that were available to them.
38
See Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 8, at 297 (note 46); and A Judge’s Journey, id., at
393-94.
39
A Judge’s Journey, id., at 393.
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the man who had abused her. This comment seems to have had a big
impact on Justice Dickson, and to have played a part in leading him to
change his mind. The story is interesting in a number of ways. It shows
us that unanimous decisions do not necessarily reflect easy agreement,
but may have to be struggled for. It also makes visible the complexity of
ways that judges participate in the decision-making, and the kinds of
interventions (invisible to the rest of us) that contribute to a collective
decision. It is a reminder of the importance of having a variety of
divergent groups represented on the Court, in order to facilitate better
decision-making.40
Another significant element is that the judgment was delivered as
unanimous and anonymous. It was authored not by one of the nine
embodied judges, but rather by “The Court”. By publishing the opinion
in this fashion, the judges of the Court emphasized the unanimity of their
position. They also attempted to construct a text that did not speak in the
“voice” of any particular judge. This not only makes it difficult for
people to “re-politicize” the case through speculation about the judge in
whose name the case is issued, it also serves to more visibly make the
text speak in a voice beyond the individual judge, to speak instead the
voice of “the Court”, the voice of “the law”.
There certainly is a politics to the attribution of authorship to “the
Court” as a whole. But the use of such a device also makes visible the
collaborative nature of the venture: the nine judges have had to agree
that the judgment will appear in the name of no one, though somehow a
material text must be constructed in which the opinion of the Court will
be voiced.
The Dickson biography gives us some insight into how that anonymous and unanimous text was materially produced. We know that the
first draft came from Justice Dickson’s chambers. We also know that
Justices La Forest and Gonthier had concerns with parts of that text:
Justice La Forest indicated that he would be writing separate reasons.
For the reasons to be published unanimously, they would have to be
changed. Discussion, debate, compromise and modification ensued.
Though the judges had unanimously agreed on the result at the hearing,
40
There are of course current empirical projects studying group decision-making, many of
which focus on the importance of having divergent views in a group to ensure better decisionmaking. For example, Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2003).
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it would take months before they produced a text in a singular voice.
Agreement on reasons did not imply agreement on results. If Justice
Dickson’s chambers were sending out drafts, the work of constructing a
draft that could be agreed upon was very much a collective enterprise,
requiring active work by many judges.
The background texts around this case make it clear that the Court
was very conscious of its place in the “intertextual hierarchy”.41 The
judges knew that they were not only dealing with a private law issue
between Tremblay and Daigle, but were also being asked to weigh in on
questions about “standing” (the rights of ordinary citizens to challenge
laws that did not affect them personally), human dignity, fetal rights and
abortion. Even though the final text is silent in this regard, the Court, in
hearing Tremblay v. Daigle,42 were still standing in the shadow cast by
their 1988 decision in R. v. Morgentaler.43 They would still be operating
against the reverberations of Justice Wilson’s important concurrence, in
which she had said that most men could only respond imaginatively at
best to the dilemmas confronting the pregnant woman. Even though the
opinions make no reference to that case, it is clearly a participant in the
unanimous reasons of the Court in this case. It is worth considering then
the lack of a concurrence from Justice Wilson. The decision not to say
something more about women and choice in the interests of producing a
unanimous opinion may be seen as another indicator of collaborative
practice. Of the final text, we know that Justice Wilson said she “worked
very hard on that to get the judgment by the Court” and that she “was
happy with the way that one worked out in the end”.44
In this rare glimpse behind the screen, we can see the extent to
which the production of law is a collaborative process, and indeed, more
deeply collaborative than we tend to acknowledge. While one could look
behind the voice of “The Court”, and claim that it is really the voice of
“Dickson”, such a conclusion would miss the mark. Even if the text was
written in Chief Justice Dickson’s hand (or typed on his keyboard), there
is much in the opinion that simply cannot be said to “be Dickson”. Given
the compromises necessary, we know that there are things there that are
41
The phrase is Julia Kristeva’s. Dorothy Smith uses it to identify texts which govern the
rules for the production of other texts. See Texts, Facts, and Femininity, supra, note 20.
42
Supra, note 33.
43
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 80 (S.C.C.).
44
Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 8, at 299, note 47.
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not a reflection of his personal opinion. The pieces of the story shared
here make visible the active participation of at least five judges in the
constructing of the text. Access to the personal papers of the other judges
would undoubtedly show us even more. In short, the judicial opinion
produced, even if the words chosen can be said to be articulated in the
style of one judge, is a product of a number of interventions. It is much
more than the sum total of nine votes. It is both more and less than the
opinion of the nine judges standing in support of the text from behind the
pen name of “The Court”.

IV. CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF JUSTICE WILSON
We return then to the beginning and the question that Justice Wilson
asked in the Betcherman Lecture: Will women judges make a
difference? Our empirical project, and the process of counting opinions,
has raised more questions for us than it answered. The empirical data
affirms that “difference” is indeed visible in the work of Justice Wilson:
she wrote the highest proportion of concurring opinions, was second in
dissents only to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, and had by far the highest rate
of authored opinions in divided cases. But what are we to make of these
numbers, of these “differences”? What difference does difference make?
Or rather, what role might these differences play in the making of law?
The heightened patterns of dissent and concurrence in the work of
Justice Wilson (or indeed in the first three women judges) do not lead us
to conclude that women judges judge “differently”. Nor did those
studying the early Charter cases. They concluded that the women judges
were as likely to disagree with each other as with their male colleagues.
The fact of gender does not enable us to predict how a judge will vote.
Neither do we conclude from the heightened rate of dissent that Justice
Wilson (or women judges more generally) disagreed with greater ease.
The numbers alone tell us little about the felt experience of dissent, or
about the cost to a judge of articulating a minority view. Furthermore, if
it is the case that all judges engage in practices of dissent, it is not the
case that dissenting comes to all judges with equal ease. Differences in
both human personality and legal theory play a role here. The point at
which a judge determines that compromise is impossible and dissent is
necessary will vary with that judge’s personality, with how that judge
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understands the balance between law’s contradictory demands for
stability and responsiveness, and with the judge’s understanding of what
is at stake in the particular case.
The French legal system’s rejection of judicial dissent provides a
useful reminder: some theories of law place a very high premium on
judicial unanimity. And while our own system authorizes dissent,
theoretical orientations vary: some judges incline in the direction of
seeing dissent as generally valuable; others see dissent as a necessary
evil, to be deployed only where compromise is simply not possible.
Furthermore, a dissent may be produced as much because of a majority’s
inability to find a compromise position as because of a dissenter’s
propensity to disagree. The fact of dissent cannot lead us to draw firm
conclusions about the personality or theoretical understandings of Justice
Wilson or any other particular dissenting judge.
Differences visible in the statistics encourage attention to authorship,
but at the same time, the collaborative process of decision-making
challenges traditional assumptions about the nature of authorship. There
are some good reasons, for example, to distinguish Justice Wilson in her
“judge-function” from Justice Wilson in her “author-function”. The
authorship of a judicial opinion (whether majority or dissenting) is not
the same as the authorship of an article, a novel or a speech. And yet, a
Supreme Court opinion is akin in many ways to a cinematic text. Both
are produced under the name of an identifiable author/director, one who
plays an important part in the generation of the text. And both texts, in
spite of being signed under the name of a particular person, are produced
under conditions of deep collaboration. It is important to remain
conscious of this collaborative dimension when attributing responsibility
to judicial “authors”. The making of opinions, even solo dissents,
involves many participants and inputs, and the attaching of a single
judicial name provides a kind of shorthand for the authorial attribution of
a collectively generated product.
Justice Wilson’s own divergent forms of participation in the written
and signed judgments suggest the importance of paying attention to
authorship, but it remains important that authorship not be fetishized.
For while we use authorial names in speaking of particular opinions, it is
useful to understand those judgments as products of larger collaborative
ventures. While the opinion bears the signature of a judge, it is too quick
a leap to say that “the judicial opinion” is equal to “the judge’s opinion”.
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Other judges are involved as more than simple signatories to another’s
work.
There are additional questions about difference. Justice Wilson was
involved in a great many concurring opinions. Should we treat these as
similar to or distinct from her dissenting opinions? What difference does
it make when judges disagree over reasons rather than results? What is
the difference between a concurrence and a dissent, and what might we
learn from greater attention to the concurrence as a particular kind of
legal opinion? Justice Wilson’s opposing forms of participation in the
signed and authored opinions (primarily with the majority in the signed
opinions, diverging from the majority in the authored opinions)
encourage greater attention to the different ways that judges participate
in the process of constructing judgments, ways that may not always be
visible in the final texts themselves. Justice Wilson may have disagreed
at a heightened rate, but she also actively participated in many
unanimous and majority decisions, and collaborated even in those
decisions that do not bear her name. Her dissents and concurrences are
important texts in their own right, opening space for imagining law
otherwise. They also are important players in the process of constructing
law, as the clash of difference alters the shape of each opinion produced.
The empirical snapshot and the reflections about institutional
ethnography combine to focus our attention on the complexities in the
production of law, of the many possible ways of thinking about the
voicing of judicial opinions. Certainly, we are left reflecting on how
voice matters. Years after reading the text of the Betcherman Lecture,
we listened to the audio-recording of it posted on the Internet.45 Here, the
substance of the text echoed in the measured pace and musical lilt of
Wilson’s Scottish-accented voice. There was something magical in the
moment of listening. Would the substance of the lecture have been any
different if issued in a male voice? Or if it had been spoken in a voice
not carrying the traces of an immigrant’s voyage and experiences? Or in
the voice of Canada’s 100th rather than first female Supreme Court
Justice? Does authorship matter? Does voice matter? What difference
does difference make? What difference did Justice Wilson make? She
posed for us questions for which she did not have answers, questions that
remain as provocative and pressing today as they were when she first
45
To hear the lecture, see online at: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/05/31/bertha-wilson-%E
2%80%9Cwill-women-judges-really-make-a-difference%E2%80%9D-hear-justice-wilsons-speech/>.
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shouldered the burden of so many expectations. One thing is certain:
Justice Wilson, whether signing or authoring opinions, whether aligned
with the majority concurrence or dissent, lent her voice to the making of
the law in Canada, law that would not have been the same without her.

